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The 1980s have witnessed two related but distinct attacks on in-
dependent agencies.1 One attack is grounded in constitutional theory.
Some have argued that independent agencies, those "strange amal-
gam[s]" that blend the functions of all three branches but are the crea-
tures of none, violate the separation of powers doctrine in the
Constitution.2 This approach has been labeled "neoclassical" 3 or the
"new formalism."4 These terms suggest a rediscovery of fundamental
constitutional principles. Another attack proceeds from an organiza-
tional perspective. Without clear lines of authority from one branch of
government, independent agencies are politically unaccountable, and
therefore vulnerable to regulatory inefficiency and external manipula-
tion. 5 In essence, the independent agency form is organizationally dys-
functional. This functional critique is almost as old as independent
agencies, yet the criticism continues unabated.
These two lines of attack are distinct in several ways. One questions
the constitutionality of a form, the other criticizes its function. The lat-
ter has a long history; the former reflects a reawakening and expansion of
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J.D. 1977, University of California (Boalt Hall) School of Law. The author is grateful to her col-
league, Professor Franklin E. Zirming of Boalt Hall, U.C. Berkeley, for his comments on this essay.
1. For purposes of this discussion, independence refers generally to agencies not within old
line executive departments. The dominant meaning of independence, then, is autonomy from presi-
dential control. M. REAGAN, REGULATION: THE POLrrIcs OF POLICY 66 (1987).
2. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 41-45. For similar views, see Currie,
The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 19; Note, Incorporation of Independ-
ent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985).
3. Miller, supra note 2, at 53.
4. Note, supra note 2, at 1766.
5. There is a large amount of literature on agency capture, including the concern that in-
dependent agencies, with less clear lines of accountability, were more susceptible than other institu-
tions in government. For a summary of this view, see discussion in M. REAGAN, supra note 1, at 52-
66. The most cited work in this area is Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sm. 3 (1971). Stigler's central thesis was that "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit." Id. at 3. Another early critic of
independent agency form was Marver Bernstein, who believed that the dogma of independence
posed a threat to political democracy. M. BERPNsTEIN, REGULATING BusINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 128-30 (1955).
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a traditional argument. They are related in one significant way. Both
critiques present themselves as politically neutral, questioning the form
of regulatory agencies rather than their political purpose or effect.
Joined together, as they often are, these two themes have become the
1980s assault on the fundamental legitimacy of independent agencies.
How can we explain the timing and intensity of the present debate
on independent agency structure? After all, independent agencies have
been around for one hundred years, 6 and have been created to accom-
plish myriad complex governmental tasks. One way to understand this
controversy is in relation to the underlying political context in which it
has arisen. The attack on the imperial presidency had its beginnings in
the post-Watergate period. From 1974 to 1980, Congress flexed its grow-
ing political muscles. Congress used its power to accomplish goals that
were politically liberal. Among its activities was the creation of numer-
ous administrative agencies to implement social regulation in pursuit of
the liberal agenda.7 Congress also passed legislation that put constraints
on executive power in the wake of the Watergate scandal.8
President Reagan's election in 1980 presaged a resurgent executive
branch that challenged the hegemony of Congress. The White House
began to use its power on behalf of conservative goals. The executive
branch confronted two significant political problems. First, it was faced
with the liberal political legacy, including regulatory agencies whose
mandates conflicted with administration policy. Second, conservatives
could not consistently constrain Congress, which constantly threatened
the administration's ability to accomplish its ideological goals.
The constitutional and functional arguments are the by-products of
this epic political struggle. Regulators always seem vulnerable to criti-
cism and can be attacked on functional grounds. Even better, if in-
dependent agencies were declared unconstitutional, these unruly
bureaucracies would be absorbed by the executive branch.9 The result
6. The first independent agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in
1887. See M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 3.
7. The list of agencies created in the 1970s is long, although not all of them were independent
in form. Key independent agencies include the Consumer Product Safety Commission (1972). The
Environmental Protection Agency (1969) is in a category of its own: a line agency, reporting to the
President, but independent of any cabinet department.
8. One important piece of legislation was the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-512, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app.,
18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. app., and 39 U.S.C.), which was recently unsuccessfully challenged
on separation of powers grounds, see infra note 13 and accompanying text.
9. Some have argued that independent agencies are "arms of Congress" and thus part of the
legislative branch. This seems to be stretching reality. As Miller stated: "The 'arm of Congress'
theory is typically unsupported by argument.... The fallacy in the argument is too grotesque to bear
elaboration." Miller, supra note 2, at 64 (footnote omitted).
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would be, at least in the short run, fewer obstacles to the administration's
policies. In these pages, I wish to take the neutral critiques at face value,
discussing both the constitutional and functional attacks of the past six
years in light of a longer empirical tradition of studies of regulation. My
conclusion is that of the noncombatant academic: the abolition of in-
dependent agencies would not matter much.
Can this be? The intensity of the debate easily leads one to assume
that significant consequences will ensue if independent agencies disap-
pear. On the surface, there would indeed be major structural shifting.
However, a closer look at the literature provides a useful perspective.
Political scientists have asked these questions: To what extent do the
formal structural ties of agencies to the federal branches affect regulatory
outcomes? How much does form matter? The conclusion of their empir-
ical work points to the limited relevance of this debate to political
outcomes.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE
The constitutional argument against independent agencies is a
straightforward one. It is clearly reflected in Bowsher v. Synar. 10 In this
case, the Supreme Court held that the Comptroller General of the United
States could not exercise the functions that the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Act delegated to him. Those functions were descried as "execu-
tive," and incompatible with the power Congress retained to remove the
Comptroller from office by joint resolution. Congressional removal
power over an officer performing executive functions would constitute an
impermissible encroachment on the separation of powers doctrine. Ad-
mittedly, the Court asserted that the opinion did not cast "doubt upon
the status of 'independent' agencies because no issues involving such
agencies [were] presented." 1' However, a logical extension of the reason-
ing in the case, as well as dicta in the lower court opinion,' 2 suggest that
independent agencies would be vulnerable if challenged directly.
The Court recently examined a related problem in Morrison v. Ol-
son. 13 Independent counsel Alexia Morrison won a stunning 7-1 reversal
of a D.C. Circuit opinion holding that the independent counsel provi-
sions of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act violated the separation of
10. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
11. IdL at 725 n.4.
12. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1389-99 (D.D.C.) (Scalia, Johnson & Gasch,
JJ.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).




The legislation at issue in both cases threatened the immediate polit-
ical power of the executive branch. Can the formalistic approach be sep-
arated from the political implications of such a view? Are the
constitutional theorists oblivious to, or implicitly supporting, this poten-
tial increase in executive power?
Adherents of the formalistic separation of powers doctrine in the
executive branch appear to be motivated primarily by political, not neu-
tral goals. Conservatives within the Reagan administration are clearly
aware that the executive stands to gain from the use of constitutional
arguments, in these specific cases and if applied more generally. Former
Attorney General Edwin Meese III has argued that the notion of agen-
cies outside the executive branch should be abandoned.15 The Solicitor
General's brief in the Gramm-Rudman Act case came as close as one can
come to a direct challenge to independent agencies.16 Indeed, political
commentator Michael Kinsley argued that conservatives in the executive
branch are using constitutional law simply to increase their power:
"They think they will always control the executive branch, and they're
boyishly eager to break down all the (inherently conservative) barriers to
strong presidential action." 17
This use of constitutional principles for political ends is not surpris-
ing. Reagan appointees have not hesitated to abandon their ideology
when it suits their political purposes. For example, the administration
has often invoked the principles of "new federalism." New federalism, a
central tenet of the 1980 campaign, advocated the return of power, ar-
guably usurped by the federal government, to the states.1 8 The adminis-
tration, however, has enhanced federal power on a number of
occasions. 19 For example, the Reagan White House supported a federal
14. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson,
108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Before the Supreme Court's Morrison opinion issued, scholars saw the case
as part of a larger effort to reestablish firm boundaries between legislative and executive authority by
groups unhappy with the power of independent regulatory agencies. See Coyle, Separation of Pow-
ers: A Classic, Nat'l L.L, May 2, 1988, at 3, 3, 22.
15. See Meese, Towards Increased Government Accountability, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 406
(1985) (reprint of Address Before Federal Bar Association, Sept. 13, 1985).
16. See Brief for the United States at 27-51, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (No. 85-
1377).
17. Kinsley, Rightist JudicialActivism Rescinds a Popular Mandate, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986,
at 25, cols. 3, 6.
18. For a discussion of new federalism, see Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. REG.
93 (1983). Mr. Gray was counsel to the Vice President.
19. Preemption of state laws is the tool often used. Congressional power to preempt state laws
arises from the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. There has been a trend whereby
administrative agencies, both independent and executive, have engaged in preemptive behavior. For
an analysis of preemption by the executive branch, see Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experi-
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OSHA fight-to-know rule that preempted many protective state statutes,
and federal product liability legislation that would remove the traditional
autonomy of the state courts in tort law. Both positions would greatly
increase the power of the central government at the expense of the states
and appear to be based on partisan rather than neutral principles.20
While the judiciary may be aware of the political implications of the
separation of powers argument, it is not certain whether or how much
politics has influenced its analysis. It is widely believed that Justice
Scalia authored the lower court opinion in Bowsher v. Synar prior to his
elevation to the Supreme Court.21 Justice Scalia, once a member of the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, was not unaware of any
political implications, both in relation to Gramm-Rudman and the
broader sweep of the arguments. Indeed, the opinion makes direct refer-
ence to the political context of the case:
It may seem odd that this curtailment of such an important and hard-
fought legislative program should hinge upon the relative technicality
of authority over the Comptroller General's removal... [b]ut the bal-
ance of separated powers established by the Constitution consists pre-
cisely of a series of technical provisions that are more important to
liberty than superficially appears, and whose observance cannot be ap-
proved or rejected by the courts as the times seem to require.22
And, in dicta, there is a discussion of the status of independent agen-
cies in relation to the separation of powers doctrine. The court finds the
relevant precedent on the issue of removal of officers "stamped with some
of the political science preconceptions characteristic of its era and not of
the present day."' 23 The court then raises questions about the contempo-
rary justifications for the existence of independent agencies. While there
is no direct attack on the constitutionality of this form, doubts about its
viability are clearly intimated.24
It may simply be a happy accident that well-known conservative
Reagan appointee Scalia's principled judicial stance, subsequently af-
ment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. Rnv. 1429 (1984); Foote, Regulatory Vacuums: Federal-
ism, Deregulation, and Judicial Review, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 113 (1985).
20. See Gray, supra note 18, at 96-106. For a critique of Gray's approach, see Foote, Beyond
the Politics of Federalism: An Alternative Model, 1 YALE J. REG. 217 (1984).
21. Dwyer, The Gramm-Rudman Ruling May Turn into a Deadly Weapon, Bus. WK., Mar. 3,
1986, at 36; Kinsley, supra note 17, at 25, col. 3.
22. 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1403 (1986).
23. Id. at 1398.
24. It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that there can be such things as
genuinely "independent" regulatory agencies, bodies of impartial experts whose indepen-
dence from the President does not entail correspondingly greater dependence upon the
committees of Congress to which they are then immediately accountable; or, indeed, that
the decisions of such agencies so clearly involve scientific judgment rather than political
choice that it is even theoretically desirable to insulate them from the democratic process.
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firmed by the Supreme Court, coincided with his political preferences
and those of the President who appointed him. There is nothing in the
case that would suggest to me that politics, rather than constitutional
principles, guided the arguments.25
Theories of federalism provide a useful analog to the formal ap-
proach detailed above. Federalism also involves principles of separation
of powers, albeit between levels of government rather than among federal
branches. After reviewing Supreme Court decisions on federalism, one
can conclude that members of the Court appear to apply neutral princi-
ples of constitutional law regardless of the political outcome in any par-
ticular case. California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.26
illustrates the point. The issue before the Court was whether the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission could require mining companies conducting fed-
erally approved mining activities on federal land to comply with state
environmental permit requirements. The mining company, Granite
Rock, sued to enjoin the California commission from compelling it to
comply. The political alignments were predictable. The Reagan admin-
istration sided with the mining company, arguing that the federal govern-
ment preempted the states. (So much for states' rights!) 27
Environmentalists supported California, joined by nineteen states, the
Western Governors' Association, and other state organizations.
How the Justices lined up is instructive. The conservative justices
did not support the administration's arguments. Indeed, the author of
the opinion that upheld California's environmental policies was a Reagan
appointee, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. She was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-strange bedfellows if
politics were the deciding factor. Justice Powell dissented in part, on the
grounds that federal agencies had already considered the environmental
effects of the mining and that the state should not impose a separate and
duplicative permit system. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice White, dis-
sented on similar grounds.28
In other cases involving disputes between federal and state govern-
ments, the Supreme Court apparently has not divided on purely political
25. Before Morrison v. Olson was decided, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), many viewed the special
prosecutor case as "profoundly political." Alfred Kahn, for example, argued that if the Supreme
Court were to sustain the decision of the D.C. Circuit and the official position of the Administration
itself, "it will be impossible to escape the suspicion that the decision was political." Kahn, The
Special-Prosecutor Stakes, N.Y. Times, Meay 9, 1988, at A19, cols. 1, 3.
26. 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
27. See supra note 18.
28. 107 S. Ct. at 1422, 1432, 1438.
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lines.29 Of course, the Justices must follow congressional intention to
preempt the states. However, that intention may be sufficiently obscure
so that the Court engages in federalism balancing. To the extent that
there is an observable pattern in their decision, it is that Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor are more likely to rule in favor of the states; Justice
Blackmun and former Chief Justice Burger are more likely to fall on the
federal side. If these patterns mean anything, they may reflect federalism
preferences. But they cannot be explained by partisan politics, as the
Granite Rock case so clearly demonstrates.
A. The Functional Critique.
The critique of the organizational form of independent agencies in
the literature seems based on neutral principles of accountability and effi-
ciency. However, much of the present debate pays slight lip service to
principles of government, and is blatantly political in nature. A closer
look at two structural reform proposals illustrates the short-term polit-
ical nature of the debate.
Concerned about deteriorating aircraft safety, Congress mandated a
study of the problems of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regula-
tion. The President was empowered to appoint a study commission,
which released its final report on April 18, 1988.30 It called for a "major
structural overhaul" of the Federal Aviation Administration. A key rec-
ommendation was to make the agency independent of the Department of
Transportation, a traditional executive agency. Oversight of the new
FAA would be vested in a nine-member board appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate. There would be two officials ap-
pointed to seven-year terms, an administrator to manage the new agency,
and a director of aviation safety to oversee regulations. The purpose of
these structural changes, according to the panel, is to free the agency
from the management of the Department of Transportation and from
29. See, eg., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409
,(1986). In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld preemption by the federal government of state regulation
of ratable-take contract rules. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, Bren-
nan, White and Marshall joined. Rehnquist dissented, joined by O'Connor, Powell and Stevens. See
also Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986). The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's
allowance of FCC preemption of state depreciation policies for state share of jointly used telephone
equipment. The decision was 5-2, with Brennan, Rehnquist, Stevens, White and Marshall in the
majority. Burger and Blackmun dissented without opinion. For further discussion of these and
other cases, see Foote, New Federalism or Old Federalization: Deregulation and the States, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM 41 (H. Scheiber ed. 1987).
30. At the time of this writing, the author was unable to obtain copies of the recently released
report. Descriptions of the recommendations are based on contemporaneous news reports.
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control by the Office of Management and Budget.31
Predictably, the Reagan Administration was highly critical of the
proposal. Transportation Secretary James Burnley said: "Safety regula-
tion and enforcement must remain subject to strict control and oversight
by the federal government. ' 32 Some members of Congress, however,
welcomed the report, which supported a pending Senate bill, the Federal
Aviation Administration Independent Establishment Act of 1987. The
legislation would, among other reforms, create an independent FAA. 33
Clearly Congress expects to have greater influence over the regulation of
air safety with an independent agency in charge.
Both Representative Henry Waxman (D., Cal.) and Senator Albert
Gore (D., Ky.) have introduced legislation to change the appointment
process of the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The primary provision of both bills would make the Commis-
sioner subject to Senate confirmation upon nomination by the Presi-
dent.3 4 Presently, the Commissioner is appointed by the President with
no congressional involvement. The legislators do not provide justifica-
tion for this change based on any neutral principles of good government.
Indeed, all the reasons presented in the legislative history are political
ones. To Congress, independent means more congressional oversight:
The Committee believes that Senate confirmation is a constructive and
worthwhile process. It is a procedure that provides the Congress with
an invaluable opportunity for oversight. It is a procedure that should
apply to persons appointed to serve as Commissioner of the Food and
Drug Administration. 35
The primary justification for the change is that all other major fed-
eral health and safety agencies require Senate confirmation of presiden-
tial appointees. 36 These agencies were formed in the 1960s and 1970s,
when a powerful Congress won greater agency autonomy from the exec-
utive branch. Much of the legislation enacted during that period experi-
31. Witkin, Powerful New.Role Is Urged for FAA on Airline Safety, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988,
at Al, cols. 1, 2; McGinley, Air Safety Panel Seeks Independence for FAA as Part of a "Major
Overhaul," Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
32. McGinley, supra note 31. It is interesting that by the term "federal government," Burnley
means the executive branch, not Congress or independent agencies.
33. S. 1600, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4, 133 CONG. REc. S11,473, S11,473 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1987).
34. H.R. 1226, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 1, § 904, 133 CONG. REc. H3025, H3025 (daily ed.
May 4,1987); S. 223, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(a), introduced, 133 CONG. REc. S154 (daily ed. Jan.
7, 1987).
35. H.R. REP. No. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
36. The list includes the Federal Aviation Administration, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as other entities within the Department of
Health and Human Services. Id.
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mented with a variety of procedural and structural forms to ensure that
administrative agencies would pursue the goals of the law. 37 The FDA,
by contrast, has its roots in the Progressive era, and its ties to the execu-
tive branch are due to historical accident, not inequitable treatment.3 8
Predictably, the Reagan administration opposes this legislation to in-
crease congressional oversight of the FDA. The tension between the
branches is illustrated by the following exchange between Representative
Waxman and Senator Gore. Gore testified before Waxman's
subcommittee:
Mr. WAxmAN.... Let me just ask you one question. The admin-
istration is going to testify later today that they think it is unnecessary
for the Senate to confirm the Food and Drug Administration Commis-
sioner. I suppose they would think it is unnecessary to have confirma-
tion for some of the appointments which have to go to the Senate for
confirmation.
But, do you think that there is any adverse effect on the indepen-
dence of an FDA Commissioner from the administration, by having
the requirement that the Commissioner go before the Senate for
confirmation?
Mr. GORE.... I do not think so. Indeed, I think it would en-
hance that person's independence, because instead of being subject to
the whim of an immediate superior, he would have the extra insulation
afforded by this new role played by a second branch of Government.
37. In 1976, Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). Advocates of the legislation in Congress wanted
to ensure that the law would be properly implemented. The concerns of Representative Rogers (D -
Fla.), one of the authors of the bill, are reflected in subsequent correspondence with the Commis-
sioner of FDA. Rogers wrote:
During consideration of the medical device legislation ... I was innundated [sic] with
assertions that the Food and Drug Administration would implement the proposed new law
the way it wished, without regard to legal requirements. My response to these assertions
was twofold: First, the legislation would be written in a detailed fashion so that all affected
parties (including the Food and Drug Administration) would know their rights and re-
sponsibilities. Second, the Subcommittee would monitor the implementation of the legisla-
tion to insure FDA actions comported with the requirements of law and the intent of
Congress.
Letter from Rep. Paul Rogers to Alexander M. Schmidt, Commissioner of FDA, June 21, 1976,
reprinted in Foote, Administrative Preemption, supra note 19, at 1446 n.74.
38. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was passed in the wake of adverse publicity concern-
ing adulterated food products. One of the prime supporters of federal action was one Dr. Harvey
Wiley, who was a chemist for the United States Department of Agriculture. The administration of
the new law was placed in his Bureau of Chemistry. Numerous amendments were passed in subse-
quent years, including the creation in 1927 of a separate law-enforcement agency known as the Food,
Drug and Insecticide Administration, later the Food and Drug Administration. Following the pas-
sage of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1938, FDA was transferred from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to the Federal Security Agency. The FSA became the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953, and more recently the Department of Health and Human
Services. See generally H. NEAL, THE PROTECTORS: THE STORY OF THE FOOD AND DRUG AD-
MINISTRATION (1968).
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As for the expected, or the mentioned, opposition on the part of
the administration, I would urge the subcommittee to heavily discount
that as merely a knee-jerk reaction.39
It is clear that the issue is not government structure for its own sake.
There appears to be no coherent theory of why agencies have been
designed to be executive or independent in any particular case. The di-
versity of forms is, in the words of Peter Strauss, "characteristic of our
pragmatic ways with government, reflecting the circumstances of the
particular regulatory regime, the temper of presidential/congressional re-
lations at the time, or the perceived success or failure of an existing
agency performing like functions, more than any grand scheme of gov-
ernment." 4° In the case of FDA, it is a political conflict between Demo-
crats in the Congress and a Republican administration. 41 Politics matter,
and structure is a weapon in the battle.
The participants in the debate all assume that structural changes
will affect outcomes. The more pragmatic question is whether or how
much form really matters.
B. The Limitations of Form.
If structure matters to political outcomes, one would expect to see
the executive branch exert greater influence over executive agencies, and
Congress to have more influence over independent ones. Several political
scientists have tried to measure the influence of Congress and the execu-
tive branch on independent agencies. The results are instructive. In
their study of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a classic independ-
ent agency, Weingast and Moran challenged the argument that regula-
tory agencies are largely autonomous. 42 Using data analysis of FTC
activities from 1966 to 1979, they concluded that the agency was tied
closely to the congressional subcommittee charged with oversight.43 Be-
cause FTC had strong structural ties to Congress, this conclusion sup-
ports the view that structure matters. However, the authors make
39. Senate Confirmation of the FDA Commissioner; and Reauthorization of Research Activities
by ADAMHA: Hearings on H.R. 3909 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
40. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 584-85 (1984).
41. Newspaper reports suggest that the Reagan Administration had instituted changes at FDA
that affected the independence of FDA scientists. These moves included transferring authority to
HHS to decide important issues, and strengthening the power of the Office of Management and
Budget. Administration and FDA officials declined to comment on the legislation. Specter, The
FDA's Declaration of Independence, Wash. Post, Feb. 22-28, 1988, at 34, col. 1 (weekly ed.).
42. Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Poli-
cymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcoN. 765 (1983).
43. Id. at 791-92.
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another point that is noteworthy. Their research indicates that congres-
sional influence over agency choices can occur without systematic, con-
tinuous, or publicly held oversight hearings. 44 In other words, there are
many informal mechanisms of control.
Informal influences can follow formal ties and strengthen them; in-
formal influences can also transcend or supersede formality. The work of
another political scientist, Terry Moe, underscores the importance of in-
formal control.45 Moe studied several independent agencies, including
FTC, during the same period as Weingast and Moran. He asked: "Has
presidential influence been exercised in such a way as to bring about
changes in the general direction of commission behavior?" 46 Arrived at
through formal empirical modeling techniques, Moe's findings suggest
that regulatory behavior does shift across administrations, and that it
varies systematically with presidential partisanship. Presidents appar-
ently do achieve a measure of direction and control over independent
agencies.
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from these empirical
analyses. The most important is that there is not one set of influences
defined by formal relationships. Both Congress, often through its sub-
committees, and the executive have means by which to influence regula-
tory decisions. The political outcomes cannot be predicted simply by a
look at the formal ties of government. The political environment, and
the nature of political pressure, is much more complex and subtle.
While I have not performed statistical analyses comparable to the
work of Moe and Weingast, observations of the present political environ-
ment support the conclusion that executive and congressional influences
are not restrained by formal relationships to agencies. A brief look at
three different federal agencies will illustrate the point.
It is well-known that the executive branch was quite strong vis-a'-vis
Congress during the first term of the Reagan Administration. The Ad-
ministration has exercised a significant influence on regulatory agencies.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), an execu-
tive agency within the Department of Labor, has fallen prey to the Ad-
ministration's lack of commitment to health and safety.47 There have
been drastic cuts in budget and staff. The research arm of OSHA has a
44. Id. at 792.
45. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197
(1982).
46. Id. at 197.
47. See Trost, Occupational Hazard: A Much-Maligned OSHA Confronts Rising Demands with
a Reduced Budget, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1988, at 25R, col. 1.
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budget less than half of what it was eight years ago (in 1980 dollars).48
Because OSHA is an executive branch agency, significant reductions in
its activities reflect a lack of administration support. This result would
not challenge the view that structure matters.49
However, the administration has had an equally poweful impact on
another safety agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), which is formally independent. CPSC was born during the hey-
day of the consumer movement. Congress wanted a visible independent
commission that was not buried "in the bowels of some large executive
department. '50 Despite its independent status, CPSC has atrophied in
the hands of the present administration. In 1981, former budget director
David Stockman tried to abolish it. Although he did not succeed,
CPSC's staff has been cut by more than forty percent and its budget by
almost a quarter since 1981.51 CPSC has become, if not a do-nothing, a
do-very-little agency. There have been reports of conflict among the
commissioners, and their decisions are characterized by inaction and ex-
cessive delays. For example, CPSC acknowledged that cigarette lighters
were a major cause of child deaths, but waited nearly three years to take
any action. One disgruntled staffer said: "'The signal from above ap-
pears to be that we really don't want you to do anything, so you kind of
just sit back and you don't push for anything.' "52
In some cases, however, there have been constraints on the power of
the administration. The need to cut back on environmental protection
was one of Reagan's campaign themes.53 The National Journal reported
on the eve of the 1981 inauguration: "[I]f anything can be predicted in
the new Administration, it is an effort to trim the powers of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and other environmental regulators." 54
EPA is considered an independent agency within the executive branch.
55
The Administrator is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
48. Id. at 26R, col. 3.
49. Congress is now becoming more aggressive in support of OSHA. During April 1988, Sena-
tor Kennedy (D - Mass.) charged that the agency was lax in its enforcement. Both the Assistant
Labor Secretary and the OSHA Administrator testified at recent Senate Hearings. Kennedy com-
mented; "We're going to have a new Administration after this fall and, hopefully, we can get this
agency back on track again." author, OSHA Chief Denies "Retreat from Safety," N.Y. Times, Apr.
21, 1988, at 25, col.l (late ed.).
50. M. REAGAN, supra note 1, at 49.
51. Waldman, Kids in Harm's Way, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 1988, at 47-48.
52. Id.
53. M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE PoLrrIcs OF DEREGULATION 212 (1985).
54. Mosher, Reagan and Environmental Protection-None of the Laws Will Be Untouchable, 13
NAT'L J. 17 (1981).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1987).
[Vol. 1988:223
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Senate. The President has authority to discharge the Administrator at
will.
However, structure does not confer power without consequences.
Reagan appointed William Ruckelshaus to serve as Administrator after
Anne Gorsuch Burford resigned in the midst of strong criticism. Strauss
concluded: "Even in executive agencies, the layer over which the Presi-
dent enjoys direct control of personnel is very thin and political factors
may make it difficult for him to exercise even those controls to the fullest.
An administrator with a public constituency and mandate, such as Wil-
liam Ruckelshaus, cannot be discharged-and understands that he can-
not be discharged-without substantial political cost."'56
To account for the varying influences of politicians, both executive
and legislative, one must look at the entire political environment. Fur-
thermore, that political context is more than just a tug of war between
Congress and the Executive. Indeed, there is empirical evidence for the
view that regulatory agencies are influenced by a wide range of factors,
including Congress, the President, and the courts, as well as agency staffs
and economic conditions. 57 In addition, there are important influences
in the private sector. Some studies of interest groups, particularly the
regulated industries, find powerful effects on regulatory outcomes.5 8 The
influence of industry can be so substantial that many have expressed con-
cern about agency "capture."' 59 Public opinion also helps shape the pref-
erences of the politicians. Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk have
analyzed the complex array of political and social forces that brought
economic deregulation in 1975-1980.60
Another look at FDA illustrates the importance of all the public
and private interests in shaping administrative behavior. FDA is fully
embedded in the executive branch. Although committed to reducing
regulation, President Reagan never directly attacked the existence of
FDA. And, his often-used techniques of budget cutting met with resist-
ance from all sides. Why?
It is clear that there has always been public sentiment in favor of
safe medical products. Despite frustrations with FDA on specific issues,
public support has rarely wavered. Congress has remained active in its
oversight role, and has been quick to criticize the agency for inaction.61
56. Strauss, supra note 40, at 590 (footnotes omitted).
57. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB 79 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1094, 1095 (1985).
58. See, eg., THE PoLrIcs OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
59. See supra note 5.
60. M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 53.
61. In 1979, the American Enterprise Institute reported that drug regulation engendered more
congressional inquiries and General Accounting Office (GAO) reports than any other area of regula-
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It is interesting that the industries regulated by FDA have not advocated
its demise. One explanation is the nature of FDA's mandate, particu-
larly over drug safety. In order to get a drug on the market, FDA must
review the premarket approval application. FDA provides a barrier to
entry. Budget and staff cuts simply delay the decisions of the agency; no
pharmaceutical company benefits by this type of "deregulation." Sec-
ond, FDA provides credibility to the pharmaceutical industry by placing
its imprimatur on approved products. And, the availability of unified
federal action has served the drug industry well in certain instances. Fol-
lowing the Tylenol tampering episode in 1980, manufacturers of over-
the-counter products used FDA to get mandatory, uniform packaging
requirements. FDA's speedy response helped restore credibility to the
industry and prevented costly marketing competition on tamper-proof
packaging options.6 2 Finally, the requirement of FDA approval has been
use to support qualified immunity from tort liability for drug products.63
When powerful members of Congress ally with public interest
groups and industry, the executive branch is severely constrained despite
its formal authority. Political alliances can vary in different circum-
stances, and these forces need to be studied with care. For example, dur-
ing the toxic shock crisis, other companies in the highly competitive
feminine hygiene market did not come to the defense of Procter and
Gamble, the producers of Rely brand tampons. FDA, under pressure
from the public to act, and presented with a badly divided industry, man-
aged to isolate an industry giant and negotiate a consent decree.64 The
shifting alliance among the many stakeholders significantly affects regu-
latory outcomes in any particular case.
tory law. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, PROPOSALS TO REFORM
DRUG REGULATION LAWS 1 (1979) (Legislative Analysis No. 8, 96th Congress). FDA was recently
criticized by Congress for failure to aggressively regulate medical devices. See SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., IST
SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD (Comm. Print 1983).
62. 21 C.F.R. § 211.132 (1988).
63. Compliance with FDA requirements has never been an absolute defense to product liability
actions. Such a defense has been proposed by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in
federal product liability reform proposals. A recent appellate court decision in California, Collins v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1539,-, 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (1986), held that
any prescription product that requires FDA approval is unavoidably unsafe as a matter of law and
thus outside the parameters of strict liability for defective design. The case is pending before the
California Supreme Court. Id. at-, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 396, rev. granted sub nom. Collins v. Karoll,
- Cal. 3d -, 732 P.2d 542, 234 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1987); see also 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194 (1986)
(deleting Court of Appeal decision and noting grant of review).
64. For a detailed discussion of the Rely case, see Foote, Corporate Responsibility in a Changing




The two critiques of independent agencies can be presented in a non-
political, neutral light. The Reagan administration and its supporters are
using these critiques to further purely partisan ends, although it is less
clear whether the members of the judiciary have pursued the constitu-
tional challenge for political reasons. Liberals in Congress reject these
two critiques because of their own present political posture.
The more pragmatic question is whether this debate, regardless of
the motives of the participants, will ultimately affect the behavior of' in-
dependent agencies. Does the structure of administrative agencies mat-
ter? My answer is a resounding "it depends." Independence is one
factor among many in the complex political environment in which regu-
latory policy is made. When Congress is strong, it can impose its imprint
on the structure of the administrative state through the creation of in-
dependent agencies. When the balance of power shifts, however, formal
structures cannot prevent pressure, even domination, by the executive
branch. There are many other critical factors that influence regulatory
outcomes, including powerful business interests and the public at large.
My answer should be reassuring to those who fear serious political
upheavals if the formal separation of powers doctrine succeeds in its
challenge to independent agencies. Separation of powers may be of
greater importance to constitutional theorists than to regulators. And, if
theory is merely a cover for political views, the approach will backfire.
Not only does the power of the executive and legislative branches shift
over time, but their politics do as well. Political conservatives may well
discover that their efforts to strengthen the executive branch will come
back to haunt them when there is a new occupant in the White House.
Woodrow Wilson once wrote: "[G]overnment is not a machine, but
a living thing.... No living thing can have its organs offset against each
other as checks, and live."165 Excessive reliance on form, whether for
constitutional or functional reasons, is short-sighted and probably irrele-
vant. All institutions of government, including independent agencies, are
subject to the complex political influences that characterize a democratic
state. My guess is that the organisms of government will survive any
effort to impose rigid formal structures upon them.
65. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908).
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